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Colonial Imprints: Settler-Colonialism as a  
Fundamental Feature of Israeli Constitutional Law 
Mazen Masri 
 
Abstract: 
Many constitutional questions in Israel are dealt with through the lens of the 
nation-state paradigm where the state is constitutionally associated with an 
ethnically and religiously defined majority group. Thus, many of the challenges 
that face Israeli society and the legal system are often presented as a result of an 
exceptionally antagonistic majority-minority relationship in a nation-state. This 
article offers a novel way of analysing the Israeli constitutional regime using the 
framework of settler-colonialism. It argues that adding the settler-colonial lens 
will help better understand many features of Israeli constitutional law. Drawing 
on theoretical frameworks developed by theorists of colonialism, the article 
explores a number of foundational aspects of Israeli constitutional law and 
demonstrates how they were shaped, and continue to be shaped, by settler-
colonialism. The article argues that settler-colonialism is one of the central 
features that animate Israeli constitutional law.  
 
1. Introduction 
The fundamental constitutional principle that Israel is the nation-state of the 
Jewish people is one of the most significant factors that shape debates in Israeli 
constitutional law (Rubenstein & Yakobson 2009; Gans 2008; Ben Shalom v. CEC 
1989; CEC v. Tibi 2003; Ornan v. Ministry of Interior 2013). The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly emphasised this principle ruling that ‘the raison d’etre of the state is 
being a Jewish state’ (CEC v. Tibi 2003:21) The nation-state in this context is 
understood as ‘a framework for organising nations on national, ethnic, cultural, 
historical, religious basis within a state framework’ (Gavison 1999:26; 
Rubenstein & Medina, 2005:319), and as such it provides exclusive advantages 
to the ethnic group that the state is associated with, and imposes ‘a burden’ on 
those who do not belong to same group (Gavison 2002:54). The nation in the 
                                                           Senior Lecturer, The City Law School, City, University of London. E-mail: 
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‘nation-state’ is the religiously defined Jewish nation which does not include the 
entire population of the state but rather a narrower group which constitutes 75% 
of the population. Approximately 20% are Palestinian Arab (officially known as 
Israeli Arabs). Thus, the population is legally and politically divided along 
national lines, and there will always be a minority (or minorities, as the official 
position is) that do not belong to this nation. The strong constitutional 
association of the state with an ethnically and religiously defined group and the 
inevitable existence of minorities animate significant aspects of Israeli 
constitutional law. This is especially true when it comes to the relationship 
between the state and the native Palestinians who are Israeli citizens. The 
meaning, justification and the implications of the constitutional definition of 
Israel as a Jewish and democratic state are inherently linked to the nation-state 
paradigm which is often presented as a normative paradigm and not just as a 
descriptive model. Similarly, the question of who is included in the nation, which 
in the Israeli context is the question of ‘who is a Jew’, is one of the most 
important questions of Israeli constitutional law (Pesro (Goldstein) v. Minister of 
Interior 1995).  
The dominance of this paradigm over Israeli constitutional law is 
palpable in many areas. Much of the academic writing on Israeli constitutional 
law, especially on areas such as immigration, citizenship, human rights, political 
participation, equality, and resource allocation, centres on this paradigm or at 
least engages it through discussions of the Jewish character and its significance, 
majority-minority relations, majority rights, or minority rights. A majority of 
authors on these topics defend the use of the nation-state paradigm and the 
associated hegemony and advantages granted to members of the associated 
nation (Rubenstein & Medina, 2005; Rubenstein & Yakobson 2009; Gans 2008; 
Gavison 1999; Gavison 2002; Kretzmer 1990; Barak 2004; Saban 2004). Others 
take more critical approaches to the nation-state question and highlight some of 
its problems. Some, like Azmi Bishara (2005) and Baruch Kimmerling (1999) 
highlight the incompatibility between the Jewish definition and the notion that 
the state should belong equally to all its citizens, which is an essential 
characteristic of democracy. Highlighting the ideal of citizenship, Nadim 
Rouhana and Nimer Sultany note how the Jewish character of the state was the 
justification for adopting measures that restricted the scope of rights and 
political activity (Rouhana & Sultany 2003). Gad Barzilai approaches the 
question from a socio-political point of view that acknowledges the existence of 
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communities with multiple identities and complex relationships with the state 
and state law. Barzilai observes that even when liberal values are adopted by the 
legal system, this does not result in any significant change since there is no 
recognition of Palestinians as a community, and liberal frameworks assume equal 
access to political power which is not the case in Israel (Barzilai 2000; Barzilai 
2003). Hassan Jabareen makes similar points highlighting the prominence of 
Jewish identity in constitutional discourse and the failure of the legal system to 
see Palestinians as a national group but rather as disparate religious sects, which 
affects the allocation of civil rights (Jabareen 2002). 
This approach, which highlights majority-minority relationship in a 
nation-state, fails to take account of or explain historical events and many of the 
state policies. For example, it does not take account of the process by which the 
majority became a majority and the minority became a minority. Nor does it take 
into account the fact that the majority is comprised of recent immigrants 
compared to the indigenous minority. It also fails to explain many of the policies 
that are related to land control and expropriation, political representation, and 
population control.  
 In this article, I challenge the dominance of the nation-state paradigm 
(and its corollary, the majority and national minority tension) and offer a novel 
way of looking at the Israeli constitutional regime. I argue that in order to 
understand many features of Israeli constitutionalism, especially (but not 
exclusively) the relationship between the state and the Palestinians who are also 
Israeli citizens, we need to go beyond the nation-state paradigm and analyse it 
through the lens of settler-colonialism. I further argue that settler-colonialism is 
one of the central features that animate Israeli constitutional law. In this context, 
settler-colonialism is not necessarily in conflict with the nation-state paradigm, 
but rather adds the relevant insight that this is a case of a settler-nation in a 
settler-colonial context, which has implications for the evolution and shaping of 
the law.  
Since the 1990s, there has been a marked increase in academic research 
that uses settler-colonialism to inform analysis about the Israeli state and 
society.1 Most of these studies situate Israel in the same category as other settler 
states such as Australia, Canada and the United States. The studies encompass a 
wide range of disciplines. Lawyers and law as a discipline, however, are lagging 
                                                          
1 For a list of some titles on the topic, see section 2.2. 
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behind. Thus far, apart from some studies that make links between settler-
colonialism and Israeli land law (especially in the context of the treatment of the 
Bedouins who are part of the Palestinian population) (e.g. Amara, Abu-Saad & 
Yiftachel 2013; Bhandar 2016),2 there have been no publications that explore the 
links between settler-colonialism and Israeli law in general or Israeli 
constitutional law in particular. In this article, I will start the task of filling this 
gap, and chart the way for research in this direction. In doing so, I rely and build 
on the work of two major authors whose work has contributed tremendously to 
the study of colonialism. I draw on the work of the anthropologist Patrick Wolfe 
who is one of the leading theorists of settler-colonialism. Wolfe’s major 
contribution is in proposing ‘the logic of elimination’ as the main features of 
settler-colonialism. The logic of elimination-which encompasses a range of 
practices, not all of them physical or violent- has become one of the leading 
concepts used in settler-colonial studies. The second author is Anthony Anghie, 
whose work on colonialism and international law has contributed to shaping a 
new approach to studying law known as Third World Approaches to 
International Law.  
The exploration focuses on three foundational aspects of Israeli 
constitutional law. Taking a functional approach, a constitution is not limited to 
formal written texts but rather extends to rules, principles, theories and 
interpretations that allocate and regulate power within the state, and govern the 
relationship of the state with the public (Elkins, Ginsburg & Melton, 2009). The 
discussion will therefore include a range of sources which include Basic Laws, 
legislation and case law. The three foundational areas I focus on play a significant 
role in the constitutional order. I begin with the Declaration of Establishment 
of the State of Israel, which is a document of constitutional and historical 
significance that declared the end of one constitutional order and the founding 
of a new order and polity. The second aspect I examine is the composition of 
the polity, which was shaped through citizenship and immigration laws and 
policies. Citizenship, which indicates membership in the polity, claims a central 
role in defining and regulating the relationship between the individual and the 
state and is the legal expression of this relationship. The third aspect relates to 
political representation in the institutions of government. The idea of 
                                                          
2 Alexandre Kedar explores the theme of legal geography in settler societies, but he does 
not explicitly use the term settler-colonialism (Kedar 2002).  
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representation is central to parliamentary systems and governing in general. 
Given that this is the first attempt to introduce settler-colonialism as a tool of 
analysis to understand the development and the operation of the constitutional 
order, I will end this article with a few remarks and a suggestion for a research 
agenda.  
 Before I elaborate on the argument, I want to highlight that the 
discussion in this article concerns Israel within the 1967 borders. All references 
to the Palestinians, unless otherwise indicated, refer to Palestinians who are also 
Israeli citizens. The analysis provided here could also be extended to the 
occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, but this article will be limited to Israel and 
Israeli constitutional law only.  
 
2. Israel and Settler-colonialism 
2.1. The Emergence of Settler-colonial Studies  
Settler-colonialism has emerged as a new field of study in the past four decades. 
Many studies, from a variety of disciplines focus on settler-colonialism as a 
distinct form of colonialism. This area of study emerged from the realisation that 
colonialism has many strands, and that the types of colonies differ according to 
a number of factors (Fieldhouse 1967). While some colonies were colonies of 
‘occupation’, others were colonies of settlement. Settlement colonies, which 
Feildhouse classified as plantation colonies, mixed colonies, or pure colonies, 
are ‘characterized by a significant and permanent –or at least long-lasting- 
population of Europeans’ (Fredrickson 1988:219). Settlers in such colonies ‘had 
some expectation of transplanting “civilization” (basic aspects of the way of life 
that they had left behind in their countries of origin) to the new environment’ 
(Fredrickson 1988:219).  
 Settlement colonies share many features with other forms of colonialism, 
but they have their own dynamics and unique aspects that call for studying 
settler-colonialism as a distinct field of inquiry. In settler-colonies, settlers come 
with the intention to stay (Veracini 2010:53). They form societies distinct from 
the native population and seek to control land and resources and establish their 
own economy and modes of governance. Thus, as Caroline Elkins and Susan 
Pederson argue, settler-colonialism is marked by ‘a particular structure of 
privilege’ (Elkins & Pederson 2005:4). The privilege is expressed in deep and 
pervasive inequalities between the settler and indigenous populations. Such 
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divisions are usually ‘built into the economy, the political system, and the law’ 
(Elkins & Pederson 2005:4). 
Land plays an important role in settler-colonialism. As Patrick Wolfe 
explains,  
[t]he primary object of settler-colonization is the land itself rather than 
the surplus value to be derived from mixing native labour with it. 
Though, in practice, Indigenous labour was indispensable to Europeans, 
settler-colonization is at base a winner-take-all project whose dominant 
feature is not exploitation but replacement. The logic of this project, a 
sustained institutional tendency to eliminate the Indigenous population, 
informs a range of historical practices that might otherwise appear 
distinct – invasion is a structure not an event (Wolfe 1999:163). 
 
 The logic of elimination does not necessarily mean actual physical or 
violent elimination. Wolfe sees it as having positive and negative dimensions: 
‘[n]egatively, it strives for the dissolution of native societies. Positively, it erects 
a new colonial society on the expropriated land base’ (Wolfe 2006:388). 
Highlighting that it is a structure and not an event, Wolfe emphasises that in its 
positive dimension ‘elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial 
society rather than a one-off (and superseded) occurrence’ (Wolfe 2006:388).  It 
could be pursued through a range of practices that could include actual physical 
elimination, displacement, or assimilation, which targets the cultural identity, 
heritage and institutions of the indigenous population. 
 
2.2. Israel as a Settler-Colonial State 
As part of the development of settler-colonialism as a discipline, many writers 
argue that the Zionist colonisation project is a form of settler-colonialism. The 
scholarship on the issue started as early as the 1960s, (Sayeg 1965; Trabulsi 1969) 
and developed throughout the 1970s and 1980s with significant contributions 
by Maxime Rodinson (1973), Edward Said (1979) and Elia Zureik (1979). These 
authors highlighted the fact that the Zionist movement started in Europe with 
the majority of the Israeli society having been recent immigrants from mostly 
European states. They also emphasised features that are characteristic of settler 
societies such as the effort to control the land at the price of dispossessing and 
displacing the native population, deep antagonism and conflict with the native 
population, and separation between the settler society and the native society. In 
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1989, the sociologist Gershon Shaffir (1989) published a book that used 
comparative settler-colonialism to analyse important historical events that 
predated the establishment of Israel and had significant implications for the 
formation of the Israeli state and society. This study linked state formation and 
some social and political trends to settler-colonialism. 
The use of settler-colonialism as an analytical framework has intensified 
in the past decade, and a substantial literature on the issue has emerged with 
academics from a variety of disciplines examining a diverse range of questions 
through the lens of Israeli settler-colonialism. The studies cover almost the full 
spectrum of the social sciences and the humanities, including history, sociology, 
anthropology, gender and women studies, religion, sexuality studies, literature, 
geography, and citizenship studies (e.g. Piterberg 2008; Robinson 2013; Shafir & 
Peled 2004; Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2015; 
Amara, Abu-Saad & Yiftachel 2013; Morgensen 2012; Masalha 2013). On the 
other hand, this perspective has been rejected by other academics that highlight 
the historical, cultural and religious ties between the Jewish people and the 
region. They argue that Jewish settlement in Palestine cannot be seen as 
colonialism since many Jews view it as their ancestral land. Some writers 
distinguish Zionist colonisation from other forms of colonisation arguing that 
the Zionist immigrants were not sent by a colonial power as in, for example, 
North America or Australia (Dershowitz 2003; Tuvia Frilling 2003; Rubenstein 
& Yakobson 2009; Aaronsohn 1996).  
Despite the opposing views, settler-colonialism provides a useful 
analytical tool for understanding certain attitudes and trends within the state and 
society. Settler-colonial states differ in a number of respects from the nation-
state model that is presented by authors such as Gavison (2002), Rubenstein and 
Yakobson (2009) which is mostly based on east and central European states 
where the hegemony of the dominant national group is often presented as an 
inevitable and justified outcome of national self-determination of a specific 
national group. Settler states on the other hand were created as a result of settler-
colonialism, and as such, many features of settler-colonialism such as the 
political domination over the native population and the need to control the land 
become central themes that define the relationship with the native population. 
As Wolfe notes in the case of Australia, ‘[t]he determination “settler-colonial 
state” is Australian society’s primary structural characteristic rather than merely 
a statement about its origins.’ (Wolfe 1999:163). The notion that settler-
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colonialism does not ‘end’ with the creation of the settler-state but rather 
becomes one of its defining feature is also shared by Elkins and Pederson (Elkins 
& Pederson 2005:3). As such, the political domination, the structure of privilege 
and Wolfe’s logic of elimination are carried on into the settler state. 
In this article, I do not aim to prove that settler-colonialism applies to 
Israel, but rather, relying on the considerable academic literature on the topic, I 
take this as a premise. Of course, as in other cases, there are differences between 
settler-colonialism in Israel and other settler-colonial situations. For example, 
Israel has a significant proportion of the settler population who are non-
European immigrants from Arab countries. Usually known as Mizrahim, this 
group was culturally close to the native population at the time of the migration. 
Nevertheless, emphasising the religious identity of the group, the founding elites 
of the state thought of this group as part of the settler group, and it served the 
role of bolstering the demographic preponderance of the settler nation (Shafir 
& Peled 2004). As in other settler-colonial situations, diversity and differences 
among the settler population did not blur the settler-native distinction (Wolfe 
1994:94). This highlights a distinct feature of settler-colonialism in Israel but 
does not negate it; on the contrary, observing that the Zionist logic of 
elimination is more exclusive than in Australia or the United States, Wolfe argues 
that ‘Zionist policy in Palestine constituted an intensification of, rather than a 
departure from, settler-colonialism’ (Wolfe 2012: 136). 
 
2.3. Settler-colonialism and the Law: Tools of Analysis 
Wolfe’s logic of elimination provides a powerful analytical tool to examine how 
settler-colonialism shapes the constitutional order. The other analytical tool that 
I adopt is Anthony Anghie’s ‘dynamic of difference’. In exploring the 
development of the concept of sovereignty in international law, Anghie focuses 
on colonialism and its underlying logic. He situates the ‘civilising mission’ at the 
centre of the colonial project, arguing that it has provided the intellectual 
justification for ‘colonialism as a means of redeeming the backward, aberrant, 
violent, oppressed, undeveloped people of the non-European world by 
incorporating them into the universal civilisation of Europe’ (Anghie 2004:3). 
This view highlights the differences between the European and the non-
European peoples and casts the latter as uncivilised and backwards, and justifies 
the use of law to ‘bridge’ this gap. Anghie calls this ‘endless process of creating 
a gap between two cultures, demarcating one as ‘universal’ and civilised and the 
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other as ‘particular’ and uncivilized, and seeking to bridge the gap by developing 
techniques to normalize the aberrant society’ the dynamic of difference (Anghie 
2004:3). In this context, ‘legal doctrines play the crucial role of identifying the 
other – and this has the effect of expelling the other from the realm of law – and 
then proceeding to develop the doctrines necessary to suppress, transform, 
redeem the other’ (Anghie 2006:394). 
 Anghie traces the operation of the dynamic of difference back to the 
colonial encounters and shows how it has animated the development of 
international law since then, and has been reproduced in dealing with colonised 
people and post-colonial states. Based on this dynamic of difference, colonised 
people were deprived of access to sovereignty, for this was the exclusive domain 
of ‘civilised’ nations. It was used in the 19th century to justify the dispossession 
of the indigenous population in North America and the colonisation of 
significant parts of Asia and Africa. It animated the Mandate system created by 
the League of Nations, and later on through the idea of international 
development, it justified the imposition of the Bretton-Woods institutions, and 
most recently, the ‘War on Terror’.  
 
3. The Logic of Elimination and Constitutional Beginnings: The 
Declaration  
The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel (the Declaration) was 
the first constitutional document of the state. Contrary to the prevailing view 
among the majority of constitutional lawyers that see it as seeking the inclusion 
of Palestinians, I examine certain textual and legal aspects of the Declaration, 
and argue that the Declaration painted a picture of Palestine as terra nullius, which 
facilitated the processes associated with the logic of elimination.  
The origins of the Declaration could be traced back to the United 
Nations General Assembly resolution 181 calling for the partition of Palestine 
into an ‘Arab state’ and a ‘Jewish state’, which was adopted in November 1947. 
The plan included stipulations that should be included in a declaration to be 
made to the United Nations before independence. These stipulations were to 
become ‘fundamental laws of the State’. As is well known, the Partition Plan was 
rejected by the Palestinians and the Arab states, and violence between Palestinian 
volunteer militias and Jewish paramilitary groups ensued. In April 1948 the 
United Kingdom announced that it would be Mandate in May 1948. The 
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Declaration was drafted under these circumstances in April/May of 1948 in 
partial fulfillment of the ‘declaration’ requirement of the Plan (Shahar 2002).  
The Declaration could be divided into three parts. The first part 
chronicles a brief history of the Jewish people, and the Zionist movement, and 
summons the moral and legal authorities in support of the creation of the Jewish 
state highlighting the history of persecution of Jews and the Holocaust. The 
second part is the declaratory one. The third part sets out some of the practical 
and legal arrangements for the nascent state and includes general statements 
about its character and aspirations.    
 
3.1. The Positive Dimension of Settler-Colonialism: Erecting the Settler Nation  
The Declaration was a momentous event for the settler society. It marked its 
transformation from a settler community under British tutelage into a collective 
of citizens in a state. It created a ‘we the people’ moment. Who was the ‘we’ in 
the Declaration? In the declaratory paragraphs, after affirming ‘the natural right 
of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in 
their own sovereign State’ (para. 10), the Declaration went on to state that: 
Accordingly we, members of the People’s Council, representatives of the 
Jewish Community of Eretz-Israel and of the Zionist movement, are 
here assembled on the day of the termination of the British Mandate 
over Eretz-Israel and, by virtue of our natural and historic right and on 
the strength of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, 
hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel to be 
known as the State of Israel (para. 11).   
 
‘We’ refers here to the members of the People’s Council representing 
‘the Jewish Community of Eretz-Israel’ and the Zionist movement. But this 
collective, this ‘we’, is not just particular in the religious/ethnic lines of inclusion, 
it is also particular in that it is mostly comprised of settlers who joined a 
collective and a political movement that aimed at creating a state that is purely 
for the settler community. The settler ethos could be seen clearly throughout the 
Declaration, but nowhere does this ethos come to life as in following paragraph 
where the Declaration describes the settlers and their deeds: 
Impelled by this historic and traditional attachment, Jews strove in every 
successive generation to re-establish themselves in their ancient 
homeland. In recent decades they returned in their masses. Pioneers, 
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ma’pilim [(Hebrew) - immigrants coming to Eretz-Israel in defiance of 
restrictive legislation] and defenders, they made deserts bloom, revived 
the Hebrew language, built villages and towns, and created a thriving 
community controlling its own economy and culture, loving peace but 
knowing how to defend itself, bringing the blessings of progress to all 
the country’s inhabitants, and aspiring towards independent nationhood 
(para. 3). 
 
This paragraph glorifies the heroism of Jewish immigrants: not just 
simple immigrants, but ‘pioneers’, who came to the country despite the barriers, 
and who were very active and energetic in building the country (‘made deserts 
bloom’) and building their own community that has its own separate and distinct 
economy, culture, and language (‘built villages and towns, and created a thriving 
community controlling its own economy and culture’). This immigration and 
settlement was not for the benefit of the settlers only. In the tradition of the 
civilising mission, the settlers also brought ‘the blessings of progress to all the 
country’s inhabitants’. The motifs of immigration, settlement, building and 
benefits for the other ‘inhabitants’ reverberate throughout the Declaration.  
 
3.2. The Declaration’s Colonial Encounter 
As a Declaration of the Jewish state, its main themes concerned the Jewish 
people. But the starting point of the Declaration was not the people but the land. 
The opening paragraph emphasised that  
Eretz Yesrael [Palestine] was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here 
their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first 
attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and universal 
significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books. 
 
After opening with the land, the Declaration moves on to chronicle historical 
events. The history here is not of the geographical area that the Declaration 
opened with, but of a trans-territorial Jewish people. It is described as a 
community trying to re-establish its state creating the impression that it seeks to 
do so on a vacant land. Not only is it vacant land, but, ‘a desert’ that lacks 
civilisation, culture or progress. The land needs the settlers to settle on it and 
reverse its horrid conditions and ‘make the desert bloom’. As Orit Kamir 
observes, as a literary text, the Declaration empties the land from the majority 
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of its inhabitants (the Palestinians) (Kamir 1999). In essence, it paints a picture 
of the land as terra nullius. The negative dimension of Wolfe’s understanding of 
settler-colonialism, the dissolution of the native society, is clear to see here. 
Having done that, the Declaration moves to the positive dimension and erects a 
settler-colonial society by admiring the pioneering settlers and their 
achievements as explained above. 
 But presenting the land as an empty desert did clash with the realities on 
the ground. The reality of the presence of a native majority which was resisting 
what it saw as an invasion was strong and could not be totally ignored, and it 
made its way to the Declaration where its framers 
appeal - in the very midst of the onslaught launched against us now for 
months - to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace 
and participate in the upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and 
equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and 
permanent institutions (para. 15). 
 
The indigenous Palestinians, or ‘the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel’, are 
not part of the history of the land but are only part of the present, and mainly 
when they plunge into the last parts of the text in the form of assailants. And 
when they do enter the text, they are presented as merely passive ‘inhabitants’, 
as opposed to the active Jewish pioneers who ‘made the desert bloom’.  
 This paragraph could also be read as an invitation to join the emerging 
state. Indeed, this oft-quoted paragraph is seen as one of the sources of equality 
in Israeli law as it offers ‘full and equal citizenship’ (Adalah v. Minister of Religious 
Affairs 2000; Ka’dan v. Land Administration of Israel 2000). However, in addition to 
this appeal, this paragraph also creates, or at least reinforces, the conception of 
the emerging (Jewish) settler nation which has exclusive control over the state 
as a matter of law. It creates the dichotomy of the we/you, where ‘we’ are the 
(Jewish) sovereign people who, by virtue of this sovereignty, can offer ‘you’ - the 
‘Other’ - citizenship and equality. This is not citizenship as of right based on 
habitual residence, nor is it citizenship based on a ‘natural and historic right’, 
similar to the rights mentioned in the Declaration as belonging to the Jewish 
people. It is citizenship that ‘we’, the civilised and cultured settler nation, will 
‘give’ to ‘you’, the violent assailants who happen to be here, if you attain a level 
of civility and ‘preserve the peace’.  
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It is reasonable to view the invitation to join the state on the basis of 
equal citizenship as a sign of commitment to equality, as it is often presented 
(e.g. Adalah v. Minister of Religious Affairs 2000); Ka’dan v. Land Administration of 
Israel 2000; Rubenstein 2000). This gesture, however, should be assessed against 
two important points. The first point is the composition of the population in the 
area that was assigned to the Jewish state according to the 1947 Partition Plan. 
According to the report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 
(UNSCOP), 49.9% of the population in the area designated for the Jewish state 
was Palestinian Arab in 1947 (UNSCOP Report 1947).3 Thus, the Declaration 
does not include 49.9% of the population but invites them, after the fact, and 
conditionally, to join as citizens. Those who are not part of the ‘we’ are a little 
less than the majority of the population if not the majority. The second point is 
that by the time the Declaration was made, about 300,000 Palestinians had been 
expelled or fled from the areas which were under the control of the embryonic 
state as part of a wider process of displacement (Morris 2004; Pappe 2007). At 
the same time the text of the Declaration was offering conditional citizenship 
and equal rights to the Palestinians, military and para-military groups that 
answered to the signers of the Declaration were actively working on expelling 
them. About 85% of the Palestinians who were in the areas that fell under Israeli 
control had been expelled or fled by the end of the war in 1949.   
 
3.3. The Legal Status of the Declaration  
Even though the Declaration is not applied directly by courts like Basic Laws -
which have constitutional status- it is a relevant constitutional document, and 
has gained more prominence after the enactment of Basic Law: Human Dignity 
and Freedom and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. Both Basic Laws refer to the 
‘spirit of the principles set forth in the Declaration’ as a reference point for 
upholding human rights. These principles include ‘freedom, justice and peace as 
envisaged by the prophets of Israel…complete equality of social and political 
rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex…freedom of 
religion, conscience, language, education and culture’ (para. 12). 
But this rise of constitutional protection of rights is relatively recent. The 
universal rights and values mentioned in Declaration did not impose legal limits 
                                                          
3 Other UN documents put the percentage of the Arab population in the Jewish state at 
50.5%.  See Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question: Report of Sub-Committee 2, 
(11 November 1947). 
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on the powers of the different branches of the state. The Supreme Court ruled, 
as early as 1948, that the Declaration is meant to announce the creation of the 
state as a matter of international law. While it does express ‘the people’s vision 
and its ‘I believe’’ (Zeev v. Officer in Charge the Tel-Aviv Urban Area 1948: 89), it is 
not a constitutional statute that regulates the validity of legislation. The status of 
the Declaration has evolved since then, and it is now considered to play a role 
in the process of interpretation of legislation (Rubenstein & Medina 2005:40). It 
is seen as ‘anchoring the basic principles of the regime’ and includes a number 
of principles that are foundational (Shakdi’el v. Minister of Religious Affairs 
1988:275). Thus, based on the spirit of the Declaration, a number of rights and 
freedoms were recognised as part of Israeli law. However, these rights and 
principles were recognised in cases of judicial review of administrative actions 
only. Legislation was immune from judicial review based on the principles 
enshrined in the Declaration (Kol Ha’Am v. Minister of Interior 1953; Kamir 
1999:522). 
The principles and values in the Declaration are not limited to the 
universal values. Many of the values are inherently connected to the settler 
nation. As former Chief Justice Aharon Barak says, the principles of the 
Declaration include ‘[t]he connection between the Land and the Jewish people, 
the right of the [Jewish] people over the Land, the revival of the Hebrew 
Language and the striving for peace’ (Barak 1994:306). The Declaration 
therefore does not always serve as an interpretative tool for the promotion of 
human rights: at times, especially when the dominance of the settler nation and 
its underlying ideology are challenged, the Declaration also serves as a tool to 
deny them. 
The prime example where the basic principles emanating from the 
Declaration were used to deny rights is the 1965 ruling in the case of Yerdor v. 
CEC (1965). In this case, the Supreme Court relied on the principles in the 
Declaration to affirm a decision by the Central Elections Committee (CEC) 
prohibiting candidates from participating in the general elections despite the 
absence of statutory authority for taking such action. The disqualified slate, 
known as ‘the Socialist List’, included members of the Palestinian Al-Ard 
organisation which was declared an illegal organisation for sympathising with 
Arab nationalism and calling for a just solution to the Palestine problem based 
on self-determination for the Palestinian people. In his opinion, then Chief 
Justice Agranat stated that in order to examine whether the CEC was authorised 
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to bar Al-Ard’s participation, a number of constitutional facts should be 
emphasised. Quoting the Declaration, he stated that there is no doubt that  
not only is Israel sovereign, independent, and freedom-seeking and 
characterised by a regime of the rule of the people, but it was also created ‘as a 
Jewish state in Eretz Yesre’l’  [and there is not doubt] that the act of its creation 
was carried out, first and foremost, by virtue of ‘the natural and historic right 
of the Jewish people to live, like all other peoples, standing in its own right in 
its sovereign state, [and there is no doubt] that this act embodied the ambitions 
of the generations for the redemption of Israel’ (Yerdor v. CEC 1965:385). 
 
Based on this constitutional fact, Agranat concluded that the CEC was acting 
within its powers when it barred the slate from participating in the elections. 
Even when the Declaration was cited as a normative source in 
recognising equal rights of the Palestinians citizens, as in the case of Ka’dan, a 
closer and more careful reading of the ruling and the context shows that it is in 
fact squarely within the settler-colonial framework. The Ka’dan ruling concerned 
a petition to the Supreme Court against the Israel Land Administration and the 
Jewish Agency for refusing to sell land in the town of Katzir (a town built on 
land expropriated by the state from other Palestinians) to a Palestinian citizen. 
The state justified the refusal arguing that because the land was allocated to the 
Jewish Agency, which, beholden to Jews only, is justified in discriminating 
against Arab. The Court, using an antidiscrimination approach, decided that the 
values of the Jewish and democratic state do not justify discrimination against 
non-Jews.  
 In providing a deeper analysis of this case, Hassan Jabareen argues that 
the Court’s approach to equality represents a new form of ‘Israeliness’ that is 
only future-oriented, which could include Palestinians, but this would be 
conditional upon assuming a new identity which would accept the ideological 
values of Zionism (Jabareen 2002:197). As Jabareen observes, the Court viewed 
the petitioners as individuals who do not challenge the Jewish identity of the 
state or the history of settlement. They are portrayed as agreeing with Zionist 
principles, even those that conflict with their interests. 4 Furthermore, they were 
                                                          
4 ͚37. The petitioner's counsel does not dispute the important role played by the Jewish 
Agency in the history of the State of Israel, nor does he criticise the policy adopted over 
many years with respect to the establishment of Jewish settlements throughout the 
country.  The petitioner states as follows in the petition: 
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not seen as an indigenous people with land claims, but merely belonging to a 
minority among the many minorities in Israel with the only collective that 
amounts to a nation being the settler nation.5 These observations situate the 
Ka’dan ruling as part of the settler-colonial process: while the negative aspect of 
(judicially) dissolving the native population and turning them into many minority 
groups that have no problem with the colonisation process is present, the 
positive dimension is also alive when the Court goes on to highlight the 
prominence of the new (Jewish) settler society. Indeed, Wolfe’s observations 
about Mabo v. Queensland (1992) apply here- the ruling in Mabo removed the 
doctrine of terra nullius at the point when it had completed its historical task 
(Wolfe 1994:122). Similarly, the Ka’dan ruling was needed to congeal and 
legitimate the earlier land expropriation which amounts to 70% of the land that 
the Palestinians used to own (Abu Hussein & McKay 2003:7), and to grant the 
state, its colonisation efforts, and its judicial system, ‘a façade of legitimacy’, as 
Baruch Kimmerling puts it (2002:1121). 
 
4. The Logic of Elimination and Population Laws and Policy 
Land is at the centre of settler-colonialism. The early Zionist maxim of ‘kiboush 
haAdamah’ [occupation of land], and the early formation of a special organisation 
(the Jewish National Fund) with the mandate of acquiring land in Palestine under 
the Ottomans and later under the British Mandate are only examples of the 
centrality of the control of land for the Zionist movement. But the presence of 
the natives on the land is a barrier for settler-colonialism. To quote Patrick Wolfe 
                                                          
"This petition is primarily forward-looking. It is not our intention to examine anew 
the long-standing policy by virtue of which (with the assistance of settlement 
organizations) settlements - kibbutzim, moshavim, and outposts -- were 
established in which, almost always, only Jewish residents lived and live. The 
petitioners are not focusing their claims on the legitimacy of the policy practiced 
in this area in the period prior to the establishment of the State and during the 
years siŶĐe its estaďlishŵeŶt.”͛ (Ka’daŶ v. LaŶd AdŵiŶistratioŶ of Israel: 284-285). 
5 ͚Indeed, the return of the Jewish people to their historic homeland is derived from the 
values of the State of Israel as both a Jewish and democratic state. From these values -- each 
separately and from their amalgamation -- several conclusions arise. Hebrew, for instance, 
is necessarily the principal language of the State, and its primary holidays will reflect the 
national renewal of the Jewish nation. Jewish heritage constitutes a central component of 
Israel's religious and cultural heritage, and a number of other conclusions are implicit, but 
need not be expanded upon at present…. The State of Israel is a Jewish state in which 
various minorities, including the Arab minority, live. Each of the minorities living in Israel 
enjoys complete equality of rights.͛ (Ka’daŶ v. LaŶd AdŵiŶistratioŶ of Israel: 281-282). 
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(who refers to the Australian historian Deborah Rose), ‘to get in the way of 
settler-colonisation, all the native has to do is stay at home’ (Wolfe 2006:388). 
Since the control of land by the settler society is inherently related to the 
demographic presence of settlers, demography becomes a central issue for 
settler-colonialism. Gershon Shafir (1989:13) expresses this centrality in his 
discussion of the ‘demographic interest’, which emerges from the 
interrelationship of land and population.  
  Elimination, as noted earlier, could take many forms which are not 
necessarily physical or violent. Some of these forms are present in the case of 
Israel, and these were sanctioned and aided by legal frameworks which were 
made possible by the settler-colonial constitutional order. Indeed, where 
violence stopped being effective, law became an effective tool in the elimination 
process. In this part, I will discuss some of the most important junctions related 
to laws and policies that regulate population. 
 
4.1. Elimination by Expulsion: The Nakba and its Aftermath 
Since the early years of the twentieth century, the leaders of the Zionist 
movement were preoccupied with what they called ‘the Arab Problem’ or ‘the 
Arab Question’. The problem was the existence of a large number of Palestinian 
Arabs, which would make the task of establishing a Jewish state -which was 
envisioned to have a Jewish majority- hard if not impossible. Israel’s founding 
Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion argued that the fact that more than 40% of 
the population in the area allocated to the Jewish state under the 1947 plan were 
Arab ‘questions our ability to maintain Jewish sovereignty… Only a state with 
at least 80 per cent Jews is a viable and stable state’ (Pappe 2007:48). The transfer 
of the Arab population was a central theme in the thinking about the ‘Arab 
question’. The idea can be traced back to the beginning of political Zionism in 
the late nineteenth century (Masalha 1992), though it was discussed and took a 
more concrete shape in the 1930s and 1940s. This mindset, which is squarely 
within Wolfe’s logic of elimination, was the prevailing mind-set on the eve the 
war in 1948. 
The skirmishes which started in December 1947 developed into a full-
fledged war in May 1948. Between December 1947 and the end of the war in 
1949, the overwhelming majority of the Palestinians living in the areas that 
became Israel fled or were expelled (Masalha 1992; Morris 2004; Pappe 2007; 
Shlaim 1995). This massive exodus reduced the number of Palestinians in Israeli-
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controlled areas by 80%-85%. The leadership of the new state saw this 
demographic shift as a major war gain (Morris 1993:153), and approvingly 
described the exodus of the Palestinians as a great achievement and ‘a miracle’ 
(Morris 2004:348). In addition to the expulsions, the state took a number of 
measures in order to block attempts to return and in order to make return 
unattractive, such as destroying the villages from which the refugees fled. Law 
played an important role in the process of preserving the ‘war gains’ and 
contributed to reducing the number of the Palestinians.  
Citizenship was only regulated in 1952 with the enactment of the 
Citizenship Law-1952. But even before it was enacted, Israel admitted hundreds 
of thousands of (Jewish) immigrants, and at the same time, continued to expel 
Palestinians. This was facilitated by conducting a census, and the enactment of 
a number of statutes which were meant to count and register the population. 
Essentially, these were the tools that aimed for completing the task of 
elimination by expulsion. During the war, even before the Israeli army had 
gained control over many parts of what became Israeli territory, the authorities 
were debating the best way to block the trickle of refugees attempting to return 
in order to ‘freeze’ the demographic picture then (Leibler & Brelau 2005:891; 
Robinson 2013:72-76). One of the ways to do so was to count and verify the 
identity of those who did not leave to make it easier to distinguish between 
returning refugees, who were designated as ‘illegal’, and Palestinians who did not 
leave, who were deemed ‘lawful’ (Leibler & Brelau 2005:892). As in other 
colonial situations, the census also played a role in the creation and maintenance 
of different population categories, the effective surveillance of the population 
(mainly Palestinians), and facilitated devising methods for their control (Leibler 
2011).  
The registration of the inhabitants was done according to Emergency 
Regulations (Registration of Inhabitants), 1948, and after February 1949, according to 
the Inhabitants Registration Ordinance-1949. Residency, in the sense established by 
this ordinance allowed the ‘legal’ residents to stay in the country. The officials of 
the Interior Ministry interpreted the provisions of the ordinance narrowly to 
exclude as many Palestinians as possible (Robinson 2013). Many of the ‘illegal’ 
residents were expelled after large ‘sweeping’ campaigns by the Israeli 
authorities. The expulsions were tempered somewhat by petitions to the 
Supreme Court. The Court’s approach, however, was not consistent and relied 
mainly on technicalities (Hofnung 1991:144). The expulsion was facilitated 
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further by the introduction of the Prohibition of Infiltration Ordinance-1954. In 
addition to expulsion, fatal force was used as a matter of policy in order to deter 
returning refugees. Morris observes that by 1956, 2700-5000 refugees were killed 
trying to return (Morris 1993:125-133, 145-147).  
 
4.2. Elimination by Grant of Citizenship 
The Citizenship Law-1952 prescribed a number of ways to acquire citizenship. 
For Jews, it referred to the Law of Return-1950. Citizenship for this category was 
automatic. Acquisition of citizenship for non-Jews, mainly Palestinians, was 
granted based on residence. According to section 3, non-Jews who were 
residents of Palestine had to meet a number of conditions in order to obtain 
Israeli citizenship. They had to prove uninterrupted residency from May 1948 
up to the day the Citizenship Law-1952 came into force (14 July 1952). While the 
law creates channels of inclusion and grants of citizenship, it is important to pay 
attention to the nuances to see the flip side of citizenship: for when it defines 
who is included and how, law also defines who is excluded. 
 The Citizenship Law-1952 essentially deprived all of the Palestinian 
refugees from the right to citizenship. It gave the legal stamp of approval for the 
elimination by expulsion making sure that this elimination is not reversed. For 
those who were not expelled the conditions of section 3 proved to be hard to 
meet for many. Because of the war situation and the arbitrary policies adopted 
since 1948, many did not meet the criteria. The result was that a significant 
number were not entitled to citizenship and had to naturalise (Robinson 2013). 
This group also lost most of their property to the state because they were 
deemed ‘absentees’ according to the Absentee Property Law-1950, giving rise to the 
oxymoronic category of ‘present absentees’. Naturalisation was subject to the 
discretion of the Minister of Interior and was not a matter of right, and many 
remained stateless until the law was amended in 1980.  
 
4.3. The Negative and Positive Dimensions of Settler-colonialism: The Law of Return 
and the Settler Society 
The eliminatory effect of the Citizenship Law cannot be fully appreciated without 
considering the Law of Return-1950. The law, whose main section provides that 
‘[E]very Jew has the right to ascend [immigrate] to the Country’, is seen as one 
of main expressions of the Jewishness of the state, in addition to being its main 
immigration law. The Supreme Court regards it as a constitutional ‘Basic Law in 
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essence’, and see is as ‘the most fundamental of all laws’ (Toshbeim v. Minister of 
Interior 2005:733). The right is given to anyone who is Jewish, his/her children, 
grandchildren and their spouses. The right is almost absolute; there are only a 
few exceptions relating to public health and safety.  
The Law of Return constitutes the cornerstone of the positive dimension 
of settler-colonialism as it presents a unique and swift channel of gaining 
citizenship which is distinguishable from naturalisation, or citizenship by 
residence. It also distinguishes the Jewish citizens from other citizens in that it 
sees all Jews as one unit subject to one rule whatever their place of origin is. 
Thus, Jews who were citizens of Mandate Palestine prior to 1948 were deemed 
as ‘olim’ (ascenders- Jewish immigrants) according to section 4 of the law. This 
provision reflects the desire to eliminate any distinction between Jews who were 
born abroad and those born in Mandate Palestine/Israel. Despite the fact that 
section 4 no longer has any practical relevance because of changes introduced in 
1980 (although it is still formally valid), it still carries symbolic and political 
significance. Barak for example cited section 4 to emphasise ‘the inclusive nature 
and broad conception of the Law of Return’ and that ‘’Aliya’ is not a technical 
term. It is a social, value-laden, and national term’ (Toshbeim v. Minister of Interior 
2005: para.23). In this sense, the Law of Return’ is the main factor in deciding the 
boundaries of the polity. The demographic impact of the Law of Return also 
highlights the positive dimension of Israeli settler-colonialism. In the years 1948-
2011, more than three million people immigrated to Israel under the Law of 
Return, with (Jewish) immigration reaching 199,516 in 1990 (Statistical Abstract 
of Israel 2012:232). Approximately 61% of all citizens classified as ‘Jews and 
others’ (others being non-Jewish family members eligible for immigration under 
the law) are reported to have a place of origin other than Israel. About 30% of 
‘Jews and others’ were foreign born in 2011. This figure was 64% in 1948 
Statistical Abstract of Israel 2012:160). 
The population policies today still follow the main logic of elimination. 
The issue of demography is still at the heart of Israel’s population policies. More 
restrictions are placed on the Palestinian citizens in Israel, mainly in the form of 
banning family reunification with other Palestinians, and more efforts are 
directed at increasing Jewish immigration (Masri 2013). These policies and the 
associated laws, which are central to Israeli settler-colonialism, are at the core of 
Israeli constitutionalism. For many, and indeed according to the Supreme Court, 
the Jewish majority is an essential component of Israel’s definition as a Jewish 
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state, and is seen as one of the foremost manifestations of the Jewishness of the 
state (Ben Shalom v. CEC 1989; CEC v. Tibi 2003; Galon v. The Attorney General 
2012). The Court even intimated that demographic concerns (of the settler 
society) are appropriate considerations to take into account when devising policy 
and enacting legislation, even if they violate protected constitutional rights 
(Masri 2013).  
 
5. Political Representation 
Elections are more than a mechanism to choose political representatives: 
political participation –to put it in the words of the German Constitutional 
Court- also means participating ‘in the legitimation of state power.’ (Maastricht 
Treaty Case, 1993: 239).  In a settler-colonial context, the participation of the 
indigenous population in the electoral process is seen as a form of assimilation. 
In Israel, all citizens are entitled to vote, but this almost universal franchise is 
controlled by certain constitutional provisions and principles that prevent 
electoral politics from being a vehicle to challenge the dominant political 
ideologies that the state was built on. 
 
5.1. Basic Law: The Knesset and the Dynamics of Difference 
In 1985, the Knesset enacted section 7A of Basic Law: The Knesset. This section 
was essentially the codification of the principle that was adopted in the Yerdor 
case (discussed in section 3.3 above). As it stands today, section 7A bans the 
participation in elections of individuals and parties if their goals and actions, 
expressly or by implication include ‘negation of the existence of the State of 
Israel as a Jewish and democratic state’ [s.7A(1)], or ‘incitement to racism’ 
[s.7A(2)], or ‘support for armed struggle by a hostile state or a terrorist 
organization against the State of Israel’ [s.7A(3)].  
The Supreme Court has dealt with section 7A in a series of cases. The 
most elaborate judicial discussion of section 7A was in the Tibi case (2003). In 
this case, discussing the interpretation of section 7A, Barak highlighted the 
democratic features of the state such as periodical elections and fundamental 
human rights. In discussing the ‘Jewish’ element of the definition, he highlighted 
its components, which  
have a Zionist perspective and a traditional perspective at the same time . . . At 
their centre stands the right of every Jew to make aliya [Jewish immigration to 
Israel] to the State of Israel, that in Israel Jews constitute a majority, Hebrew is 
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the main official language of the state, and its main holidays and symbols reflect 
the national emergence of the Jewish people, the heritage of Israel is a central 
component of the state’s religious and cultural heritage. A list of candidates, or 
a candidate, shall not participate in the election if their rejection or negation of 
these characteristics is central and dominant in their ambitions and activities 
(CEC v. Tibi 2003:22).  
 
Based on this interpretation, Barak ruled that while the evidence against Azmi 
Bishara and the party he chaired – the National Democratic Assembly- did not 
meet the evidentiary threshold, Barak commented that Bishara’s approach to the 
idea that Israel should be the state of all its citizens ‘comes close, in a dangerous 
manner, to the possibility that negates the existence of the State of Israel as a 
Jewish state’ (CEC v. Tibi 2003:43).  
The Court, along with many academics, justified the restrictions of 
section 7A using the principle of ‘defensive democracy’ - the idea that democracy 
as a system of governance should have mechanisms to protect itself. This often 
means that anti-democratic forces should not be allowed to benefit from the 
right to participate in elections since their goal is to eliminate democracy (Yerdor 
v. CEC 1965; CEC v. Tibi 2003; Rubenstein & Medina 2005:588). This is quite 
understandable when it comes to rejecting democracy or democratic principles 
such as equality or universal suffrage, but it becomes harder to justify when 
‘defensive democracy’ is invoked to exclude parties that reject the Jewish 
definition of the state because of democratic and egalitarian principles. 
Nevertheless, the idea of ‘defensive democracy’ has become so deeply 
entrenched in legal and academic discourses that the Court and academics use it 
to justify arrangements such as section 7A. 
It should be highlighted that virtually in all cases other than the landmark 
1965 Yerdor case, the Court allowed the candidacy to stand and the candidates 
or parties did participate. Section 7A imposes restrictions on political 
participation but does not inhibit it. Despite the success of the Court in 
tempering the impact of section 7A it is hard to ignore its expressive role. Law 
has an expressive function: it expresses certain sentiments about social norms or 
phenomena. This is even more pronounced when it comes to constitutional law 
which, in addition to it functional role, also reflects constitutional norms and a 
certain image of the political community. In this sense, section 7A makes 
statements about the undesirability of certain political beliefs. But more 
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interesting for our purposes are the justifications that many mainstream 
constitutional law scholars provide for section 7A. Amnon Rubenstein and 
Barak Medina, for example, offer two understandings of ‘defensive democracy’. 
The first understanding entails the defence of a democratic regime from violent 
transformation (Rubenstein & Medina 2005:605). The second understanding 
takes into account features of democracy that need to be defended more broadly. 
Those include basic human rights including the right of the Jewish people to 
self-determination, which Rubenstein and Medina see as a precondition for the 
protection of the basic rights of the Jewish collective. They argue that rejecting 
the need for a Jewish majority or Jewish self-determination in the form of a state 
could result in endangering the life of Jewish citizens since this is the only 
possible way to ensure the security of Jews. They argue that other constitutional 
arrangements, such as a bi-national state that also gives expression to Palestinian 
identity, could result in ‘severe [violent] disturbances’ Rubenstein & Medina 
2005:612). Thus a political party that aims to change the Jewish character of the 
state is seen as undemocratic because it disregards the wishes of the majority to 
define the state as Jewish (Rubenstein & Medina 2005:611), it is also seen as 
condoning violence.  
Ruth Gavison provides a somewhat similar position. She would tolerate 
a party with a ‘preference’ to change the Jewish character of the state to a ‘state 
of all its citizens’ if that position is accompanied by a commitment to democracy 
and an acknowledgment that the majority does not accept such a demand 
(Gavison 2007:165-167). But she thinks that candidates or parties should be 
banned if they assert ‘that the continuing existence of Israel as a Jewish nation-
state is not legitimate and could not be reconciled with democracy and human 
rights’ (Gavison 2007:167) because such a position means a rejection of the will 
of the majority, and a willingness to turn to ‘foreign’ elements in order to change 
it. Gavison prefaces the discussion with a contextual comment on security and 
war, and it is clear that she equates the rejection of the Jewish definition of the 
state with some kind of a security threat (Gavison 2007:166). Echoes of this 
position linking could also be heard in the Yerdor decision. In his short opinion, 
Justice Sussman asserted that for a party to be banned from the elections, its 
objectives should ‘seek to eliminate the state, to visit a holocaust upon the 
majority of its residents for whom it was created, and to join its [the state’s] 
enemies’ (Yerdor v. CEC 1965:389). He even compared the situation to a situation 
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where someone plans to get elected to the Knesset in order to hurl a hand 
grenade in its halls (Yerdor v. CEC 1965:390).  
This justification that Rubenstein, Medina and Gavison provide for 
section 7A is one manifestation of the settler-colonial outlook. It reflects a 
position that sees equal (even if limited) manifestation of Palestinian self-
determination as necessarily causing violence, and that sees a Jewish majority as 
necessary for security and even for democracy (Rubenstein & Medina 2005:626). 
This dichotomy that these authors create -of Jewish majority or self-
determination/ democracy versus Palestinian majority or a bi-national 
state/violence- echoes dichotomies that were created during colonial encounters 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. What we see here is an intellectual 
exercise similar to Anghie’s dynamic of difference: Jewish self-determination and 
dominance is seen as ‘universal’, ‘civilised’ and ‘liberal’. On the other hand the 
native Palestinians demanding similar rights are portrayed as ‘particular’, 
‘uncivilised’ and violent. Section 7A is therefore necessary to bridge this gap and 
normalise the ‘aberrant’ natives and protect the Jewish majority by limiting the 
right of the Palestinians to participate in elections if they demand rights similar 
to those reserved for the Jewish collective only. The ‘dynamic of difference’ is 
present in both the process of conceptualising the difference and the process of 
‘filling the gap’.  
 
5.2. Elimination through Conformism   
While the Court did play a role in tempering the impact of section 7A (Neiman 
v. Chairman of CEC, 1988; CEC v. Tibi, 2003) , still, the fact that in almost every 
single elections at least one Palestinian group or candidate need judicial 
intervention to stand in the elections serves to delegitimise the candidates and 
the candidacy. More importantly, section 7A plays a role in the positive 
dimensions of settler-colonialism in that it helps shape the society and provides 
a model of what assimilation in this context could be. Although section 7A does 
not necessarily block the access of Palestinian citizens to the Knesset, it does 
seek to block the access of ideas that actively seek to challenge the status quo 
based on universal values. What the section does, to put it in the words of former 
Chief Justice Meir Shamgar, is to ‘screen, in advance, what the image of the 
Knesset and its elected members will be after the elections’ (Mi’ari v Speaker of the 
Knesset 1987:211). The goal of section 7A is to stop the natives from using 
electoral politics in order to challenge the dominance of the settler society and 
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to create a new individual political actor with no claims that challenge the existing 
structure. This is essentially a form of assimilation by acquiescing to the status 
quo even if it is against the immediate interests of the native. To be clear, full 
assimilation is not really possible because of the more exclusive nature of 
Zionism that Wolfe highlights, but a form of conditional and limited inclusion 
is possible. Settler-colonialism in this sense allows incorporation that dissolves 
the native society into individuals or religious groups or clans, devoid of any 
uniting national consciousness. At the same time this does not mean full 
assimilation in the dominant settler society especially that this society does not 
recognise an ‘Israeli nation’ (Tamarin v. State of Israel, 1972; Ornan v. Ministry of 
Interior 2013). It means re-shaping the indigenous society as a group of 
individuals at the margins of the settler society (Bishara 2005). 
 
6. Conclusions: A new Paradigm and Research Agenda   
Over the past few years, many studies have demonstrated the utility of settler-
colonialism as a framework to explain and theorise certain social and political 
patterns in Israel. In this article I apply this lens to Israeli constitutional law, and 
demonstrate how settler-colonialism shapes and animates Israeli constitutional 
law. This could be seen in three foundational aspects of Israeli constitutional 
law. The negative dimension of settler-colonialism, as conceptualised by Wolfe, 
is present in the Declaration of Establishment of the State. It is also present in 
immigration and citizenship laws that highlight demography and the majority 
status of the settler group, which also indicates the undesirability of the 
indigenous minority. The positive dimension is present in the strong emphasis 
on Jewish immigration, culture and heritage. It is also present in other junctures 
such as the right to political participation. We can also see that some of the 
justifications for adopting certain exclusionary measures, as in the case of 
political representation, mirror some of the justifications the were put forward 
in the past to justify colonialism and colonial legal structures as Anghie 
demonstrates in his discussion of the dynamic of difference.  
 The impact of settler-colonialism on state law is hardly surprising, 
especially that settler-colonialism, as Wolfe describes it, is a structure not an 
event. One of the central threads that combines the three areas of constitutional 
law covered here is the emphasis on the Jewish definition of the state. The 
definition of the state is not merely descriptive but normative; the Supreme 
Court has emphasised that the state must have a Jewish majority, and highlighted 
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the primacy of other elements such as Jewish culture and heritage, and Zionism 
and Jewish settlement (see, e.g., CEC v. Tibi 2003; Gaza Shore Regional Council v 
The Knesset 2005). In this sense, the definition of the state as a Jewish and 
democratic state essentially encapsulates the negative and positive dimensions of 
settler-colonialism. Given the significance of the definition for the entire legal 
system, one can even argue that settler-colonialism permeates the whole legal 
system. The definition, according to Aharon Barak, has a ‘normative 
constitutional status that is above the law’ (Barak 2004:83). Barak sees the values 
of ‘Jewish and democratic’ as ‘standards for the interpretation of the purposes 
of all Basic Laws’ (Barak 2004:83; Horev v. Minister of Transport 1997). According 
to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, and 
as interpreted by the Supreme Court, consistency with these values is a condition 
to any restriction on human rights. Barak goes as far as suggesting a general 
interpretative presumption that assumes ‘that the general purpose of every legal 
text is to fulfil Israel’s values as a Jewish and Democratic state’ (Barak 2004:83). 
The centrality of the definition, and it relationship with settler-colonialism, it 
could be argued that the legal system will always be available to facilitate settler-
colonial policies and practices, and give them the legal cover and legitimacy.  
 This observation about the legal system and its potential role in 
facilitating settler-colonial policies and practices provides us with better tools to 
understand and analyse law. An analysis that takes into account settler-
colonialism and its impact can provide a historically, socially and politically 
informed understanding of law and its function. It can help us understand how 
law contributes to creating the ‘structure’ of settler-colonialism, as Wolfe views 
it, and how it also operates within the ‘structure’ to maintain it and the maintain 
the privileges of the settler population. Furthermore, understanding the 
relationship between settler-colonialism and law could also be an opening to 
think about possibilities of decolonisation, its shape, and what role law could 
play in the decolonisation process. Analysing settler-colonialism as a ‘structure’ 
as Wolfe advises, and the way it works and its legal nuts and bolts will be a first 
step towards thinking about decolonisation. 
 The observation that settler-colonialism permeates the legal system 
opens up the opportunity to explore how settler-colonialism shapes and 
animates other areas of law. In this article I try to demonstrate how this could 
be done in the field of constitutional law, and how this provides an important 
additional framework for understanding the existing legal arrangements. While 
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we see beginnings of such inquiry in the area of property law, research in this 
area should be extended beyond the Naqab/Negev to explore how settler-
colonialism drives the development of the law. Other areas of law, especially 
those related to the use of violence such as criminal law and procedure and 
military law, or areas where there is jurisdictional differentiation such as family 
law and education, could be fertile land for research on the relationship between 
settler-colonialism and the law.  
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